Post-Grenfell Reform: Process, Consequence and the Reality on the Ground

Executive note

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This paper examines whether post-Grenfell reform has clearly defined appropriate levels of consequence. It does not argue against stronger regulation. The previous system failed, and a more rigorous regime was necessary.

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The question is whether the current system has created a mature route from non-compliance to proportionate consequence, or whether too much of the burden is currently landing as delay, uncertainty, query cycles, commercial dispute and evidence reconstruction.

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The central proposition is simple: Grenfell has produced consequences, but there is not yet parity in how those consequences are being felt across all stakeholders. Current dutyholders, residents, leaseholders and delivery teams are being asked to carry the immediate operational demands of necessary reform, often before the supporting infrastructure, clarity and regulatory maturity needed to make that change workable have fully developed. Meanwhile, visible accountability for historic failure remains slow, complex and often commercially, contractually and legally contested.

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The expected Remediation Bill may strengthen enforcement and create clearer duties, but it also demonstrates that the path from unsafe building to accountable remediation remains unsettled.

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This paper is provided as professional commentary for general discussion. It is not legal advice, technical design advice or project-specific compliance advice.

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Introduction

The Grenfell Tower tragedy rocked the nation.

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It exposed a failure so severe that it could not be dismissed as an isolated construction defect, a single poor decision, or a technical misunderstanding. It revealed something far more uncomfortable: a built environment in which dangerous materials, weak oversight, poor information, unclear accountability and institutional complacency had been allowed to coexist inside one occupied building.

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The immediate public understanding was that inappropriate cladding had played a central role. As the evidence unfolded, the picture became wider and more damning. The fire was not caused by cladding alone. It was compounded by failures in design, product testing, procurement, inspection, regulation, building control, fire safety management and the treatment of residents.

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The final Grenfell Tower Inquiry report was published on 4 September 2024. It confirmed that the disaster was the culmination of failures across government, regulators, manufacturers, construction professionals and those responsible for the management of the building. [1]

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Change had to happen, and change did happen. The Fire Safety Act 2021, the Building Safety Act 2022, the higher-risk building regime, statutory Gateways, new dutyholder responsibilities, the creation of the Building Safety Regulator and the continuing reform of construction products all mark a decisive change in the legal and regulatory landscape.

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On paper, this was the system responding. In practice, it has created a more difficult question: has post-Grenfell reform delivered meaningful accountability, or has it mainly delivered an enforceable bureaucratic approval process that the industry, regulator and dutyholders were not properly prepared to operate?

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This paper does not argue against regulation. The previous system failed. It failed residents. It failed competent professionals. It failed building owners who assumed that statutory approvals, professional appointments, signed-off designs and product certification gave them a reliable basis for safety.

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But replacing a failed system with a more onerous process does not, by itself, create accountability. It does not automatically create competence. Nor does it resolve the deeper question of consequence.

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Grenfell was not a failure of paperwork alone

The danger in any post-disaster reform is that the response becomes procedural: more forms, more approval stages, more declarations, more uploaded evidence and more professional sign-off. Those measures may be necessary, but they are not sufficient.

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Grenfell was not simply a failure to produce the right documents. It was a failure of responsibility, judgement, competence, honesty, coordination and challenge.

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The Inquiry’s findings were deeply uncomfortable because they showed that the conditions for disaster had been created over many years. They included weak regulation, inadequate guidance, poor industry practice, product misrepresentation, professional failure and ineffective oversight.

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The lesson was not merely that the built environment needed a stricter administrative process. The lesson was that those responsible for designing, constructing, approving, owning and managing buildings must be able to explain what they have done, why they have done it, what evidence supports it and who is accountable for it.

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That is a much higher standard than record collection. It requires reasoned compliance, evidence that can withstand scrutiny and clear ownership of decisions. Most importantly, it requires consequences when those duties are not met.

 

The unresolved accountability gap

Almost nine years after the fire, the question of accountability remains deeply uncomfortable.

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The sector is already living with the practical consequences of post-Grenfell reform. Projects are delayed. Applications are queried or refused. Programmes are extended. Costs increase. Residents wait. Leaseholders remain uncertain. Building owners and delivery teams are required to produce more detailed evidence than ever before.

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Yet criminal accountability for Grenfell itself remains unresolved. Recent reporting indicates that the Metropolitan Police expect to ask prosecutors to consider criminal charges against 57 individuals and 20 organisations in relation to Grenfell. Evidence files are expected to be submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service by 30 September 2026, with charging decisions now reported as expected by 14 June 2027. At the point of writing, therefore, criminal accountability remains unresolved. [2]

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That creates a profound tension. The practical consequences of reform have been immediate for current dutyholders, residents, leaseholders, clients and project teams. The legal consequences for those directly implicated in the failures identified by the Inquiry have not yet been seen.

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This is not a call for rushed justice. It is a recognition that delayed accountability creates a vacuum. Into that vacuum comes process. The sector is told that the answer is more regulation, more evidence, more oversight and more approval stages.

But a system can become more bureaucratic without becoming more accountable.

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That is the distinction this paper seeks to explore.

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The new regime: necessary, but not fully mature

The Building Safety Act 2022 introduced a far more stringent regime for higher-risk buildings. For relevant higher-risk building work, applicants must obtain building control approval from the Building Safety Regulator before work can begin. The Building Safety Regulator guidance covers applications to construct, or carry out building work on, a higher-risk building. [3]

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The Gateway process was intended to act as a series of hold points, ensuring that safety was properly considered at key stages of development. Gateway 2 applies before construction begins, while Gateway 3 applies before completion and occupation.

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In principle, this is understandable. The sector needed a stronger regulatory approval system. Higher-risk buildings should not proceed on weak assumptions, incomplete design coordination or poorly evidenced compliance.

The problem is that the system, as it currently operates, appears to have been made enforceable before the sector had the practical capacity, guidance and competence base to operate it consistently. The Building Safety Regulator was given an enormous task: to regulate complex, technical, high-risk construction activity while the sector itself was still trying to understand what the new evidential standard required.

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That was never going to be straightforward. Construction is bespoke by its nature. Higher-risk buildings are rarely simple. Existing buildings are even more complex. Yet the regime was introduced into a sector that, prior to Grenfell, had often treated compliance as something assumed through professional appointment, product certification, building control involvement or historic practice.

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The new regime asks for something different. It asks for a coordinated, reasoned, evidence-based explanation of how the building complies with the functional requirements of the Building Regulations. That is not a small administrative change. It is a cultural one, and culture does not change simply because legislation has been passed.

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The regulator itself has also had to evolve. In January 2026, the Building Safety Regulator moved to a standalone organisation, described by government as a step towards a single construction regulator and an operational reset in its role as building control authority for higher-risk buildings. [4] That development reinforces the wider point: the post-Grenfell regulatory regime is still maturing while the sector is already required to operate within it.

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New build is only one part of the story

Much of the public discussion around Gateway 2 has focused on new-build higher-risk buildings. That is understandable. New buildings are easier to track through the approval system. They have clearer start points, clearer approval milestones and cleaner data.

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But focusing only on new build risks misunderstanding the true pressure being felt across the sector. The challenge also extends to:

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• Works to existing higher-risk buildings

• Refurbishment schemes

• Fire safety remediation projects

• Recladding schemes

• Occupied buildings with historic defects

• Projects where compliance must be demonstrated against incomplete or unreliable existing information

 

This is not a technical nuance. A new building usually starts from a proposed design, with the opportunity to coordinate evidence before work begins. An existing building starts from reality: what was built, what was changed, what was recorded, what was missed and what can now be verified.

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That reality may include:

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• Legacy construction

• Incomplete records

• Historic alterations

• Concealed defects

• Unclear original design intent

• Conflicting surveys

• Outdated fire strategies

• Inconsistent operation and maintenance information

• Undocumented decisions

• Resident occupation

• Funding constraints

• Contractor Designed Portions

• Specialist interfaces

• Practical site limitations

 

For refurbishment and remediation projects, compliance demonstration can be more difficult than it is on new build. The project team may first have to establish what exists, what was intended, what was actually built, what has changed, what has failed, and what evidence can reasonably be relied upon. Only then can the proposed works be properly assessed.

That is a fundamentally different challenge from submitting a coordinated design for a new development.

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The problem with “it is for the sector to demonstrate compliance”

One of the defining features of the post-Grenfell regime is the repeated position that it is for applicants and dutyholders to demonstrate compliance.

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Legally, that principle is understandable. The regulator should not design the building, nor should it create the compliance argument for the applicant. The dutyholder must own the case they are putting forward.

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But the practical reality has been far less comfortable. Many dutyholders entered the new regime without a mature understanding of how to evidence functional compliance under the Building Regulations. Many project teams had spent years working within a culture where compliance was treated as something that would be resolved by the design team, contractor, approved inspector, building control body or specialist subcontractor.

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The new regime requires a different level of discipline. It requires the applicant to explain:

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• What requirement applies

• How the design meets that requirement

• What evidence supports that position

• Who prepared that evidence

• Who reviewed it

• What assumptions have been made

• Where the design depends on coordination between disciplines, specialist input or evidence prepared by others

• What has changed since the application was prepared

• How the Golden Thread will be maintained through construction and occupation

 

That is not simply a submission exercise. It is a governance exercise.

The issue is that many parts of the sector were not ready for that change in responsibility: from assuming compliance through appointments and approvals, to demonstrating it through coordinated evidence. Nor was the regulator initially equipped to deal with the volume, complexity and variability of applications being submitted. The result has been delay, rejection, resubmission, frustration and uncertainty.

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The uneven consequences of reform

The sector is now experiencing the consequences of a system that appears to have been made enforceable before it was made fully workable. Those consequences are not theoretical. They are being felt through delayed approvals, repeated Building Safety Regulator queries, rejected or stalled applications, extended project programmes, increased consultant costs, funding pressure, resident uncertainty and growing nervousness around professional responsibility.

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In some cases, the issue is not that a project team is refusing to comply. It is that the legal and evidential threshold for demonstrating compliance is still being worked through in practice. Where the Building Safety Regulator considers that a submission has not demonstrated compliance, the immediate consequence is often further query, delay, refusal or resubmission. That may be appropriate in many cases. Unsafe or poorly evidenced work should not proceed simply because a project programme is under pressure.

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But this creates an uncomfortable grey area. If non-compliance is serious enough to prevent approval, at what point does it also become serious enough to trigger formal enforcement?

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That question matters because the new regime is backed by significant enforcement powers. The Building Safety Regulator’s enforcement policy identifies a range of enforcement responses, including engagement, compliance notices, stop notices, special measures and, where appropriate, prosecution. [5] Yet, at the point of writing, publicly visible prosecution activity under the new higher-risk building regime appears limited when compared with the scale of delay, rejection, query and non-compliance now being exposed.

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That does not mean prosecution should be rushed. It does mean the sector is left trying to understand where the real enforcement threshold sits. For applicants, the practical consequence is often delay. For residents, the consequence is continued uncertainty. For building owners, the consequence is financial exposure, programme risk and the burden of evidencing compliance against buildings they may not have designed, constructed or originally commissioned.

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This is particularly difficult for existing non-compliant buildings. Many of these properties have been bought, sold, refinanced, refurbished and managed through several ownership structures since the original defects were created. The current dutyholder may inherit responsibility for a building with unsafe cladding, missing records, defective compartmentation, poor historic design decisions or undocumented alterations, even where the underlying failures occurred years earlier under different ownership or delivery arrangements.

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That creates several possible routes back to compliance, but none are simple. Some buildings may be eligible for government-backed remediation funding, particularly in relation to unsafe cladding. The Cladding Safety Scheme meets the cost of addressing life safety fire risks associated with cladding on residential buildings over 11 metres in height in England and forms part of the wider Building Remediation Portfolio. [6] But those schemes are not a universal answer. Funding eligibility depends on the building, defect type, responsible entity and scheme criteria. Cladding funding does not automatically resolve wider non-cladding fire safety defects, structural issues, poor historic records or the professional evidence needed to obtain approval.

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Other buildings may require private funding, insurance involvement, claims against contractors, professional negligence actions, remediation contribution orders, building liability orders or other legal routes to recover costs from those responsible. Section 124 of the Building Safety Act 2022 allows the First-tier Tribunal to make remediation contribution orders where it considers it just and equitable to do so. [7]

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The proposed Remediation Bill appears to recognise that this position remains unresolved. Reporting following the King’s Speech on 13 May 2026 indicates that the Bill is intended to strengthen the legal route from unsafe cladding to completed remediation. It is expected to introduce a legal duty to remediate, give regulators stronger powers to compel action, and create sanctions for delay, including potential criminal prosecution where landlords fail to act. It is also reported to address longstanding gaps by allowing those who have paid for cladding works to pursue product manufacturers for some of the cost, and to place external wall assessment methodology on a statutory footing. Until the Bill text and explanatory notes are published, those details should be treated as expected policy direction rather than settled law. [8]

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If enacted in that form, it would mark a significant change in the remediation landscape. The emphasis would move from encouraging and funding remediation towards compelling it, with clearer duties, stronger regulatory intervention and potential sanctions where responsible parties fail to act. That may be necessary. The pace of remediation has remained too slow. Earlier government remediation acceleration proposals included target dates for unsafe cladding remediation, stronger enforcement pressure and a focus on identifying buildings that still require works. Government data published in May 2025 reported that 34% of identified 11 metre plus residential buildings with unsafe cladding had completed remediation. The latest available GOV.UK release at the time of writing, published in April 2026 and covering data to 31 March 2026, reported completion at 35% of monitored buildings, while noting that changes to social sector data collection mean the overall figures are not directly comparable with earlier months. [9]

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But the proposed Bill also reinforces the central issue. The system is still trying to close the gap between unsafe building, responsible party, funding route, technical assessment and enforceable consequence. That gap is particularly difficult where buildings have changed ownership, records are incomplete, original contractors no longer retain practical control, product manufacturers are implicated, and external wall assessments depend on professional judgement.

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A legal duty to remediate may create a clearer endpoint. It does not, by itself, resolve the evidence trail needed to establish what is unsafe, who is responsible, what works are proportionate, what costs are recoverable, and how non-cladding defects should be treated.

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That is where the proposed Bill matters most to this discussion. It is not just another legislative update. It is further evidence that post-Grenfell reform is still trying to convert process into consequence.

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In plain terms, the current owner may have to fix the problem first, or at least progress the route to safety, while separately trying to establish who should ultimately pay for it. That is a difficult position. It means the post-Grenfell regime is not only a safety and approval issue. It is also a property, funding, litigation and evidence issue.

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The system now asks current dutyholders to demonstrate compliance in the present, while many of the defects, omissions and decisions that created the risk belong to the past. That is where the lack of real consequence becomes most visible. Not because nothing has changed. A great deal has changed. But because the consequences are uneven.

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Responsible current owners, residents, leaseholders and delivery teams are living with the practical burden of reform, while the route to accountability for historic failure remains slow, complex and often commercially contested. That is the uncomfortable reality beneath the post-Grenfell compliance regime.

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The earlier warning: EWS1, PAS 9980 and market disruption

The current pressure around Gateway approval should not be viewed in isolation. The sector had already seen an earlier version of the same problem through the External Wall System process, Fire Risk Appraisals of External Walls and the introduction of PAS 9980.

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Following Grenfell, lenders, valuers, insurers, building owners and leaseholders were all trying to understand the risk posed by external wall systems on existing buildings. The External Wall System form, known as EWS1, was introduced in 2019 to give lenders a basis for understanding whether external wall risk affected mortgageability. [10]

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In principle, that was understandable. The market needed a way to distinguish between buildings with serious external wall risk and buildings where lending could reasonably continue. In practice, however, the process quickly became another example of a broad safety response being applied to a highly varied building stock without sufficient capacity, consistency or shared understanding.

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The market effect was severe for many leaseholders and building owners. Flats became difficult to sell, remortgages stalled, insurance became more difficult and expensive, and leaseholders were left trapped in properties they could not easily move from. Building owners were placed under pressure to obtain specialist assessments, often in a market where suitably competent professionals were limited and demand far exceeded capacity.

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PAS 9980 was then introduced to provide a more structured methodology for appraising the fire risk of external wall construction and cladding on existing blocks of flats. [11] That was an important step, but it did not remove the underlying difficulty. Existing buildings vary enormously, records are often incomplete, external wall systems can be difficult to assess without intrusive investigation, and professional judgement remains central.

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That professional judgement has become one of the most difficult parts of the post-Grenfell landscape. Consultants are not simply being asked to assess a visible condition. In many cases, they are being asked to form a view on historic design intent, concealed construction, product performance, workmanship, missing records and the adequacy of previous decisions. Many consultants will understandably be cautious about becoming the de facto owner of a previous design, particularly where the original evidence is incomplete or the as-built condition does not align neatly with any approved system.

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Remediation design has therefore become highly challenging. System-tested fire safety solutions do not always fit existing conditions. Buildings may require engineered solutions, bespoke detailing and risk-based professional judgement rather than simple replacement of one product with another. But those judgements carry liability. The result is a market where the need for expert judgement has increased at precisely the same time as the appetite for accepting that responsibility has reduced.

 

The lesson is important. A one-size-fits-all response may create the appearance of control, but it can also transfer uncertainty into other parts of the system. In the case of EWS1, that uncertainty was felt through lending, valuation, insurance and leaseholder mobility. In the case of Gateway approvals, it is being felt through regulatory delay, evidential burden, design risk and remediation programmes.

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The common thread is the same. Post-Grenfell reform has often tried to impose order on a building stock that was not documented, designed, procured or maintained in a way that allows simple answers. That is not an argument for weaker scrutiny. It is an argument for better-designed scrutiny.

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Construction products: the next consequence

The next major test of post-Grenfell reform sits with construction products.

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That matters because the Grenfell Inquiry did not only expose failure in design, approval, installation and building management. It also exposed serious questions about how construction products were tested, marketed, certified and relied upon.

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For years, the construction sector has depended heavily on product literature, test reports, classifications, certificates and manufacturer assurances. Those documents often form part of the compliance evidence chain. They are used by designers, contractors, fire engineers, building control bodies, clients and building owners to support decisions that may affect life safety.

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If that information is incomplete, misleading, poorly understood or used outside the limits of its test conditions, the consequences are serious. Product reform is therefore not a side issue. It goes directly to the question of whether the sector can trust the evidence it is being asked to rely on.

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The government has already signalled further reform of the construction products regime. Its response to the Grenfell Inquiry included action on construction products and a construction products reform green paper, and further reform has been reported through wider proposals for stronger product safety oversight and a single construction regulator. [12] [13]

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That direction is important, but it also reinforces the central argument of this paper. Post-Grenfell reform is still moving. The approval regime is not the final destination. The Building Safety Regulator, the Gateway process, EWS1, PAS 9980, remediation funding and construction product reform are all part of a wider attempt to correct failures that were allowed to develop over many years.

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The risk is that each new reform creates another layer of process before the sector has fully resolved the underlying problem: whether the evidence used to demonstrate compliance is reliable, complete, traceable and properly understood.

 

For manufacturers, this may mean greater scrutiny of product claims, testing evidence, classification reports, marketing language and routes to market. For designers and contractors, it may mean a greater duty to understand precisely what a product has been tested for, what conditions apply, and whether it is being used within the limits of its evidence. For building owners and dutyholders, it reinforces the need to retain product information, installation records, test evidence, warranties, certifications and change control records in a way that can be reviewed years later.

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That is where construction product reform connects directly to the wider post-Grenfell question of consequence. If a product is misrepresented, misapplied or relied upon without proper evidence, responsibility should not disappear into the supply chain. It should be traceable. It should be explainable. And where the evidence does not support the claim being made, there must be a route to consequence.

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A creaking approval system

The Building Safety Regulator has faced sustained criticism for delays in Gateway applications.

Government-published application data and public regulator updates have made performance an unusually prominent part of the building safety conversation. That scrutiny is significant. A regulator responsible for safety must be rigorous, but it also has to be capable of giving the sector a stable and workable route through the approval process. [14]

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The House of Lords Industry and Regulators Committee described Building Safety Regulator delays as unacceptable, while also recognising the importance of rigorous oversight in the interests of building safety. [15]

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There are indications that operational performance is improving, and that some applicants are beginning to experience clearer engagement through the process. That progress should be recognised. But improvement does not remove the wider issue. The early period of uncertainty, delay and inconsistent understanding has already shaped confidence in the regime, and the sector still needs a stable, transparent and proportionate route through approval.

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This is the tension at the heart of the system.

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Nobody serious about building safety wants a return to weak oversight. Nobody serious about life safety wants unsafe buildings approved quickly. But a safety regime that cannot operate efficiently creates its own harm.

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It delays homes, delays remediation, increases costs, creates uncertainty for residents and places pressure on dutyholders trying to act responsibly. It also risks encouraging defensive behaviour, where the objective becomes satisfying a process rather than producing a clear, proportionate and intelligent compliance case.

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That is not the culture change Grenfell demanded.

 

The reality on the ground

The practical reality is far more complicated than the language of legislation suggests.

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In practice, project teams are dealing with:

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• Unclear expectations

• Differing interpretations

• Inconsistent feedback

• Overloaded consultants

• Defensive design behaviour and risk avoidance

• Nervous clients

• Strained professional indemnity insurance conditions

• Difficulty obtaining specialist input early enough

• Poor historic records

• Confusion around the level of design maturity required

• Contractor Designed Portions that are not fully resolved at the point of submission

• Difficulty demonstrating compliance for existing buildings where original information is missing or unreliable

 

These pressures are particularly acute in remediation. A remediation project is often expected to correct historic failure, preserve safety for residents, satisfy funding requirements, work within an occupied building, coordinate multiple specialists and obtain regulatory approval against a building that may never have had a reliable Golden Thread of information in the first place.

 

That is an enormous burden. The absence of reliable records is not a minor administrative inconvenience in that context; it becomes a barrier to safety, accountability and progress. Without reliable information, the project team is forced to reconstruct the building’s history through surveys, intrusive investigation, professional judgement and risk-based assumptions. That may be necessary, but it is not efficient. It is time consuming and expensive, and it is not the same as having clear, structured and verified information from the outset.

 

This is where the post-Grenfell regime exposes a deeper truth. Many buildings were not ready to be assessed against the standard now expected of them. The problem is not merely that the new process is challenging and difficult to uphold. The problem is that the old system left behind buildings, records and decision trails that are not capable of supporting the new process without significant reconstruction.

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Bureaucracy is not the same as safety

There is a risk that the sector begins to confuse difficulty with rigour. A process can be complex without being intelligent. A submission can be long without being clear. A requirement can be enforceable without being practical. A regulator can demand evidence without also creating a shared understanding of what good evidence looks like.

 

This is crucial to the purpose of reform. Post-Grenfell reform should not become a compliance performance. The purpose of the regime should not be to generate more documents, longer submissions or defensive evidence packs. The purpose should be to support better decisions: decisions that are properly evidenced, clearly explained, proportionate to the risk, and capable of being understood by those who may need to rely on them later.

 

The central question is therefore relatively straightforward. Can the dutyholder explain, with evidence, how the building complies and how that compliance will be maintained?

If the answer is yes, the system should be capable of recognising that clearly and efficiently. If the answer is no, the system should expose the gap quickly, consistently and proportionately.

At present, too much of the system sits in the space between those two outcomes: lengthy query cycles, unclear expectations, cautious interpretation and delayed decisions. It is enforceable, but not always clear. It is demanding, but not always predictable. And although it is necessary, it is not yet mature.

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Consequence must mean accountability, not just delay

The lack of real consequence post-Grenfell cannot be understood only through the lens of prosecution.

It also has to be understood culturally.

If the consequence of Grenfell is simply that today’s applicants face slower approvals, while historic failures remain unresolved and the wider sector continues to treat information management as an administrative afterthought, then reform has not gone far enough.

Real consequence would mean:

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• Competence being tested, not assumed

• Product information being trustworthy, not merely certified

• Building control decisions being transparent and accountable

• Dutyholders understanding their obligations before projects begin

• Records being created and maintained throughout the building lifecycle

• Residents being treated as stakeholders, not obstacles

• Poor submissions being challenged early

• Good submissions being approved efficiently

• Historic defects being remediated without unnecessary procedural paralysis

• Accountability being visible at every level of the system

 

The current regime has made non-compliance harder to ignore.

That is progress.

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But it has not yet created a system where compliance is consistently understood, competently evidenced and proportionately assessed.

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That is the unfinished work.

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The central finding

The issue is not that Grenfell has produced no consequences. It has.

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Those consequences are visible in delayed schemes, extended programmes, increased costs, rejected applications, repeated queries, nervous professional appointments and a far greater evidential burden on dutyholders. They are visible in remediation projects where current owners are trying to make existing buildings safe while also establishing who should ultimately pay for historic failure. They are visible for residents and leaseholders who continue to live with uncertainty while legal, regulatory, funding and technical questions are worked through around them.

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They are also visible in the construction products debate, where the sector is being asked to revisit whether the evidence behind product performance, certification and marketing claims can be trusted, traced and tested against real use.

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But those consequences are not evenly distributed.

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They have been felt most immediately on current dutyholders, responsible building owners, residents, leaseholders and delivery teams. They have  moved more slowly on those whose decisions, products, approvals, omissions or commercial behaviours created the original conditions of risk.

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That is the central tension in the post-Grenfell regime. The system has become more enforceable. It has become more demanding. It has made weak evidence harder to hide. But it has not yet created a clear, mature and trusted route from non-compliance to proportionate consequence.

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The proposed Remediation Bill may close part of that gap, but its necessity underlines the point: the post-Grenfell system is still being built around the consequences it is trying to deliver.

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Too often, the practical outcome is delay rather than accountability, query rather than clarity, reconstruction rather than reliable records, and commercial dispute rather than visible responsibility.

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This is why the question of consequence remains unresolved. Not because nothing has changed. A great deal has changed. But because change has not yet produced a system where responsibility is clear, enforcement is predictable, historic failure is addressed, product evidence is reliable, and current dutyholders are given a workable route back to compliance.

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That is the unfinished work of post-Grenfell reform.

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Closing position

Grenfell demanded more than a new approval system. It demanded a fundamental change in how the built environment understands responsibility across design, product selection, construction, inspection, occupation, information management and long-term stewardship.

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That responsibility does not end when a project is completed, a product is certified, a design is approved, or a building changes ownership. It continues through the life of the building, particularly where decisions made at one point in time may need to be understood, tested or challenged years later.

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A stronger regulatory regime was necessary. The built environment should not return to the weaknesses of the previous system. But process alone cannot carry the moral weight of Grenfell, and difficulty should not be mistaken for maturity.

The sector needs a better version of the new system: one that is rigorous without being paralysing, clear without being simplistic, evidence-based without being reduced to document dumping, and proportionate without being weak.

Above all, it needs a system in which accountability is visible, timely and real.

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Until then, the sector will continue to live with a difficult contradiction.

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Grenfell changed everything, but not yet enough.

 

About the author

Taylor Hammond is CEO and founder of the National Building Register (NBR), a property records and compliance information platform created to improve how building information is structured, governed and made accessible across the property lifecycle.

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Alongside his work with NBR, Taylor is Director of STATUS A Ltd and actively works on complex fire safety, cladding remediation, façade replacement and legacy compliance projects across residential buildings. His work includes design governance, multidisciplinary coordination, Building Regulations compliance review, technical gap analysis of historic construction information, retrospective regularisation support and the reconstruction of legacy evidence where records are incomplete.

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Taylor’s project experience includes higher-risk and non-higher-risk residential buildings, occupied building remediation, latent defect investigation and the coordination of technical reports supporting compliance, regulatory and legal review.

He writes and speaks on building information management, Golden Thread accountability, digital trust, property compliance and the practical consequences of weak records in the built environment. His perspective is informed by both live project delivery and the wider mission of the National Building Register: to improve the long-term reliability, accessibility and governance of building information.

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This paper is provided as professional commentary for general discussion. It is not legal advice, technical design advice or project-specific compliance advice. Readers should seek appropriate professional advice before relying on any legal, regulatory or technical interpretation in relation to a specific building or project.

 

 

Source notes

These notes support the factual points in this paper. The statement on visible prosecution activity under the new higher-risk building regime has been kept deliberately cautious and should be read as a commentary on publicly visible enforcement activity at the point of writing.

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[1] Publication of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 report, GOV.UK, 4 September 2024. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/publication-of-the-grenfell-tower-inquiry-phase-2-report

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[2] Reporting on the Metropolitan Police Grenfell investigation update, including 57 individuals and 20 organisations identified for potential charging consideration, evidence files expected by 30 September 2026, and charging decisions reported as expected by 14 June 2027. The Guardian, 19 May 2026.  https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2026/may/19/grenfell-fire-police-criminal-charges-companies-individuals

 

[3] Building control approval for higher-risk buildings, GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/building-control-approval-for-higher-risk-buildings

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[4] BSR becomes standalone body in landmark step towards single construction regulator, GOV.UK, 27 January 2026. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/bsr-becomes-standalone-body-in-landmark-step-towards-single-construction-regulator

 

[5] Building Safety Regulator enforcement policy statement, GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/building-safety-regulator-enforcement-policy-statement/building-safety-regulator-enforcement-policy-statement

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[6] Cladding Safety Scheme overview, GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cladding-safety-scheme/cladding-safety-scheme-overview

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[7] Building Safety Act 2022, Section 124, legislation.gov.uk. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2022/30/section/124

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[8] King’s Speech 2026 reporting on the proposed Remediation Bill, including unsafe cladding remediation duties and manufacturer contribution powers. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2026/may/13/kings-speech-government-keir-starmer-legislative-agenda-next-12-months

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[9] Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Building Safety Remediation: monthly data release - May 2025, GOV.UK, updated 2 October 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/building-safety-remediation-monthly-data-release-may-2025/building-safety-remediation-monthly-data-release-may-2025; and Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Building Safety Remediation: monthly data release - March 2026, GOV.UK, published 29 April 2026, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/building-safety-remediation-monthly-data-release-march-2026/building-safety-remediation-monthly-data-release-march-2026.

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[10] Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, Cladding External Wall System (EWS) FAQs, RICS, current guidance page on the EWS process, EWS1 forms, lender use and PAS 9980 interaction. https://www.rics.org/news-insights/current-topics-campaigns/fire-safety/cladding-external-wall-system-ews-faqs

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[11] British Standards Institution, PAS 9980:2022: Fire risk appraisal of external wall construction and cladding of existing blocks of flats, BSI, published 2022. https://www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/insights-and-media/insights/brochures/pas-9980-fire-risk-appraisal-of-external-walls-and-cladding-of-flats/

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[12] Government response to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 report and related construction products reform materials, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/publication-of-the-grenfell-tower-inquiry-phase-2-report

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[13] Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Single Construction Regulator to ensure standards across sector, GOV.UK, published 17 December 2025. The announcement states that the proposed single regulator would bring together standards across buildings, products and professionals in the construction sector. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/single-construction-regulator-to-ensure-standards-across-sector

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[14] Building control approval application data, Building Safety Regulator campaign site. https://buildingsafety.campaign.gov.uk/building-safety-regulator-making-buildings-safer/the-building-control-authority/building-control-approval-application-data/

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[15] Building Safety Regulator delays unacceptable says Lords Committee, UK Parliament, 11 December 2025. https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/517/industry-and-regulators-committee/news/210888/building-safety-regulator-delays-unacceptable-says-lords-committee/